A copy of the Exam Questions is available here in PDF. The following answers are the “best” answers but students’ exams/grades also factored in grammar, structure and coherence. The grade equivalent of the scores are provided below.
I. Vincenzo and Sophia
(1) As Sophia’s lawyer, I will advise her that the pre-nuptial agreement is void on two grounds. First, the pre-nuptial agreement is void for lacking the extrinsic requirements for its validity. Article 77 of the Family Code requires that marriage settlements and modifications thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration for the marriage. According to Sempio-Dy (an authority on the Family Code and member of the Code Committee), the provision rules out the application of provisions in the Family Code regarding the statute of frauds on “Oral” marriage settlements, that is : verbal agreements are valid if the parties do not object to oral evidence thereof or have accepted the benefits under the contract.
The second ground available to Sophia to invalidate the pre-nuptial agreement is the illegality of the terms thereof in relation to support. Even supposing that the parties were able to execute the pre-nuptial agreement in accordance with the requirements of Art. 77, the agreement which obliges Vincenzo to only render support to their child when she enters college was in effect a compromise of future support. This is not allowed under Art.2035 of the Civil Code. As the father, Vincenzo is obliged to support his daughter under the law and Sophia need only establish the right, the need, the duty and Vincenzo’s capacity.
(2) No, the marriage is not valid because it lacks both an essential requisite and two formal requisites. Leona is only seventeen years old and the legal age of marriage is 18, with the consent of the parents.
Second, the exemption from the marriage license requirement is invalid on the ground of fraud. Vincenzo having met Leona only the previous year could not have began living with her five years earlier. Likewise the SC has held that such an exemption under the law is only available to parties living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, for five consecutive years prior to the marriage without any legal impediments. (Ninal v Badayog) Not only did Vincenzo have a prior subsisting marriage but if he had indeed been living with Leona for five years before she was seventeen, that would mean he was already her lover when she was 12.
Third, the marriage is invalid because the solemnizing officer had no legal authority to solemnize the marriage. Being the Mayor of Manila, the ceremony was obviously out of his territorial jurisdiction because it was in Taguig. The fact that Vincenzo knew the Mayor well (as the Mayor of Manila), coupled with his other acts demonstrates the lack of good faith. Even if Leona believed in the Mayor’s authority in good faith, she does not have the legal capacity to consent to a marriage.
(3) It depends on the terms of the donation and the will of the donor. The court’s ruling would be perfectly valid if the donor opts not to exercise her right to revoke the donation under Art. 86 of the Family Code, specifically on the ground that the marriage was declared a nullity (void ab initio) and within the terms of the donation, the donation was not exclusively made to only one of the spouses.
Under Art. 86 the grounds to revoke a donation propter buptias are: (1) If the marriage was not celebrated or declared void ab initio; (2) When the marriage took place without the consent of parents or guardians required by law, (3) When the marriage is annulled and the donee acted in bad faith, (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse, (5) if it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with, (6) When the donee has committed and act of ingratitude as specified by the Civil Code on donations in general.
II. Evita and Juan
(1) No, the marriage is not valid on three grounds. Under Art. 14 of the Family Code, the parties between 18-21 years old need to secure the consent of their parents before acquiring a valid marriage license. The couple clearly did not have parental consent and both were only twenty. Second, it also follows that their marriage took place without a validly issued marriage license, a formal requisite of a valid marriage under Article 3 of the Family Code. The third ground is the lack of authority by the solemnizing officer and the apparent lack of good faith by both Evita and Juan regarding his authority. They were not only Catholics (presumably from their membership in Youth for Christ/their parents in Couples for Christ) and therefore non-members of the Episcopalian church, but were at the same time law students. Given the circumstances, those facts tend to show that they would have likely known about the minister’s lack of authority.
(2) Yes, my answer would be the same even if the parties were 21. While even without the consent of their parents, the couple would still have been able to secure a valid marriage license and therefore validly enter marriage, it is unlikely in the given facts. Under Art. 15 of the Family Code, those between 21-25 still need parental advice in order to secure a valid marriage license. However, if parental advice or the advice of the guardian is not available, the marriage license will only be issued after three months. In this case the parties eloped and went to Sagada and it is unlikely that they had a valid marriage license. Likewise, as law students and Catholics, they do not seem to be in good faith in terms of the solemnizing officer’s authority.
NOTE that even if some missed out on tha patent lack of a marriage license in this problem (including the lack of good faith of the parties) some points were given provided that the answer/discussion of the law (on voidable marriages) was more or less coherent.
III. Dionisia and Fabio
(1) Yes, the marriage is valid in accordance with marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement as a marriage in articulo mortis. Art. 31 of the Family Code provides that a marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea of the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers and ports of call.
(2) Yes, the marriage will still be valid. However, under Art. 130, the default property regime in Dionisia’s subsequent marriage to Fabio may be complete separation if there has not yet been any liquidation, partition and distribution of presumptive legitimes (and registration of the same) in her previous marriage which was terminated upon the death of her first husband. The Family Code provides that this must be accomplished within one year from the death of the spouse.
IV. Miley and Jonas
(1) The absence of a marriage contract per se in the record of the NSO does not negate the existence of a marriage. Such a certification in evidence is easily overcome by proof of the marriage such as a copy of the marriage contract as well as witnesses attesting to the existence of a marriage between the parties. The presumption in favor of marriage is one which is considered among the strongest in law. In a long line of cases like Ty v Court of Appeals, the court has ruled that “State interest in protecting the inviolability of marriage as a social institution outweighs a technicality.” Further in the case of Pugeda v Trias and Martegui v CA where the same evidence of a certificate of no existing record of the marriage was presented, the court upheld the validity of the marriage in the face of other proof such as the couple deporting themselves to be so married, the testimony of witnesses and the admission of the parties.
(2) I would advise Miley to pursue the support case against Jonas because under Art. 117 of the Family Code, net fruits of the exclusive property of spouses like the rent and income earned from the row of apartments still belong to the conjugal partnership property. In any case, even if the property was not earning income, in the absence or insufficiency of conjugal partnership property, the spouses shall be obliged to pay support and obligations of the conjugal partnership from their exclusive property.
(3) No. In the case of Arroyo v Arroyo, the Supreme Court characterized the duty of spouses to live together as something purely personal. For this reason, the courts cannot compel one spouse to live with the other by an order of the court. The court may only counsel the spouse and in cases where it is proper, even uphold a decision by one spouse to deny support. However, in this case, the child below 7 properly belongs in the custody of the mother because of the tender years presumption in the Family Code. As such, having the child in her care will give rise to an obligation on the part of Jonas, to provide support to their common child.
V. Mich and Barry
(1) Yes, the divorce is valid because while the couple may have reacquired Philippine citizenship, they have not appeared to have renounced or otherwise lost their American citizenship and did get married in the US under US law. As such, their divorce is valid. But whether it will be held valid and recognized in the Philippines to enable Barry to contract a subsequent marriage, is another matter.
While there is no similar case in the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the court will sanction a divorce between Filipinos even if in the given case, it is dual citizenship and the spouses retained their US citizenship. For good measure, the Filipino spouse (who has dual citizenship) and is interested in entering a subsequent marriage in the Philippines, should consider the possible repercussions of his/her decision.
(2) In order to get married in the Philippines to a Filipino citizen, Barry will have to
Provide proof of his capacity to marry. As a foreigner, Barry has to prove his capacity to get married through the certification of his consulate officials, in this case, the US embassy. They have to attest to his capacity to marry and should certify the copy of his divorce decree.
In fact, even if Barry were to present himself as a Filipino citizen, he should still present proof of his capacity to remarry for good measure. In the case of Recio, the Filipino who validly married and divorced an Australian citizen and thereafter acquired Australian citizenship subsequently married a Filipino woman. His Filipino wife sued him for bigamy because of his prior subsisting marriage. The court held that foreign laws and foreign judgments are facts to be proven and courts cannot take judicial notice of them. As such, Recio’s capacity to remarry could not be presumed by the courts and he had to prove both his nationality and his divorce.
NOTE: In some cases, points were given even if you reached a different conclusion regarding citizenship for as long as there is a recognition that the problem/facts gives rise to an issue re: dual citizenship. Full or generous points were given when students differentiated between the issue of “validity” of the US divorce and its validity/recognition in local courts since applicable SC rules provide the standards in cases where foreign law/orders are invoked.
(3) Yes, the divorce will still be valid even if it was only Mich who reacquired Philippine citizenship. As a foreign citizen subject to US law, Barry is capacitated to marry and he need only provide proof of his capacity to marry as a foreigner through the attestation of his consular officers. Consequently under Article 26, a Filipino married to a foreigner shall have the capacity to remarry following a divorce validly obtained by the foreigner spouse.
No, Barry’s marriage to Judy Ann does not make Barry a Filipino citizen automatically because the law does not provide for this mode of acquiring citizenship. However, upon deciding to settle in the Philippines and given his marriage to a Filipino, Barry as a foreigner may petition for naturalization under RA 9139 and related laws.
On the other hand, since Barry was a former Filipino who acquired US citizenship, he can easily reacquire his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 by merely taking the oath of allegiance to the Philippine Republic.
(4) No. Under the Naturalization law RA 9139 (2000), if the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her petition for administrative naturalization will not benefit her alien husband. Only the children of Judy Ann (if any) can benefit from her naturalization. The reverse, however, is true when the applicant for naturalization is the husband. The law grants the foreigner spouse an option to have her alien certificate of registration cancelled.
The equivalent grade for EXAM scores is as follows:
SCORE GRADE NO. OF STUDENTS
100-90 1.0 0
89-85 1.25 1
84-79 1.5 0
78-65 1.75 3
64-62 2.0 0
61-59 2.25 0
58-51 2.75 5
50 3.0 1
49-45 4.0 4
44-below 5.0 28
TOTAL 42
